Adam Przeworski, a Polish-American professor of political science at New York University, has written several papers and books regarding the relationship between economic prosperity and the stability of democratic regimes. He was able to calculate the life expectancy of a democracy based on average annual income per capita. It would last in average for 8 years with a GDP per capita of less than $1,500, and 18 years when GDP per capita was comprised between $1,500 and $3,000. Once the $6,000 threshold was reached, there was only one in five hundred chance that a democracy would be replaced by an authoritarian regime. And no one has ever seen democracy disappear from a country where the GDP per capita exceeded $9,000 (source: Democracy as an equilibrium, Adam Przeworski 2004).
Naturally, wealth by itself does not guarantee democracy, as exemplified by Gulf countries. But once democracy has set in, dislodging it in a reasonably affluent society appears to be difficult.
The study does not mention whether the GDP per capita was nominal or at PPP, and whether it should be adjusted for inflation since the study was published or if those values still hold. However it does say that Argentina had a per capita income of $6,055 in 1975, and after looking it up it corresponds to the GDP per capita at PPP (the nominal was only $2,000).
Nowadays, the countries that have a GDP per capita at PPP lower than $ 6,000 are mostly confined to Africa. On the American continent, only Nicaragua, Honduras and Haiti fall in that category, and barely for the two first. In Asia, that includes only Cambodia, Nepal, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Afghanistan, Syria and Yemen.
(If we consider nominal GDP per capita, the list is longer and includes bigger countries like India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Indonesia, and even parts of Europe like Georgia, Ukraine, Bosnia, Albania and Kosovo.)
This is hugely interesting since there really seems to be a correlation between GDP per capita at PPP and the Democracy Index. Compare the maps.
Based on this, some countries that have never been democracies are ripe for a change. Obviously it does not depend only on wealth. The level of societal development (see spiral dynamics) may be a better indicator of a country's maturity toward democracy. To reach the orange meme of the spiral dynamics (science, technology, progress, liberalism, capitalism) is what really motivates a population to adopt democracy. That is why oil-rich countries from the Arabian peninsula did not become democracies despite their wealth.
Democracy requires enough education, economic freedom and liberties in general to reach the orange meme. To assess this, I will look into the Education Index, Economic Freedom of the World Index and Human Freedom Index. This should give is a good idea of what countries are ready for a democratic transition.
In Europe, the best candidate appears to be Belarus, which has a GDP per capita at PPP of $21,000 (IMF 2020), higher than Argentina or Brazil. It ranks 26th worldwide for education, higher than Austria, Spain, Italy or Luxembourg. Its score of economic freedom is 6.64 out of 10 (better than Greece or South Africa). It scores 6.65 in Human Freedom, better than Turkey, Thailand or Brazil. Yet its democracy index is horrible (2.48/10, 150th worldwide, below Afghanistan and Sudan!).
In the Middle East, Qatar, Jordan and Kuwait look the closest to reaching democratic maturity.
Naturally, wealth by itself does not guarantee democracy, as exemplified by Gulf countries. But once democracy has set in, dislodging it in a reasonably affluent society appears to be difficult.
The study does not mention whether the GDP per capita was nominal or at PPP, and whether it should be adjusted for inflation since the study was published or if those values still hold. However it does say that Argentina had a per capita income of $6,055 in 1975, and after looking it up it corresponds to the GDP per capita at PPP (the nominal was only $2,000).
Nowadays, the countries that have a GDP per capita at PPP lower than $ 6,000 are mostly confined to Africa. On the American continent, only Nicaragua, Honduras and Haiti fall in that category, and barely for the two first. In Asia, that includes only Cambodia, Nepal, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Afghanistan, Syria and Yemen.
(If we consider nominal GDP per capita, the list is longer and includes bigger countries like India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Indonesia, and even parts of Europe like Georgia, Ukraine, Bosnia, Albania and Kosovo.)
This is hugely interesting since there really seems to be a correlation between GDP per capita at PPP and the Democracy Index. Compare the maps.
Based on this, some countries that have never been democracies are ripe for a change. Obviously it does not depend only on wealth. The level of societal development (see spiral dynamics) may be a better indicator of a country's maturity toward democracy. To reach the orange meme of the spiral dynamics (science, technology, progress, liberalism, capitalism) is what really motivates a population to adopt democracy. That is why oil-rich countries from the Arabian peninsula did not become democracies despite their wealth.
Democracy requires enough education, economic freedom and liberties in general to reach the orange meme. To assess this, I will look into the Education Index, Economic Freedom of the World Index and Human Freedom Index. This should give is a good idea of what countries are ready for a democratic transition.
In Europe, the best candidate appears to be Belarus, which has a GDP per capita at PPP of $21,000 (IMF 2020), higher than Argentina or Brazil. It ranks 26th worldwide for education, higher than Austria, Spain, Italy or Luxembourg. Its score of economic freedom is 6.64 out of 10 (better than Greece or South Africa). It scores 6.65 in Human Freedom, better than Turkey, Thailand or Brazil. Yet its democracy index is horrible (2.48/10, 150th worldwide, below Afghanistan and Sudan!).
In the Middle East, Qatar, Jordan and Kuwait look the closest to reaching democratic maturity.